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In the last decade, formal logics have been used to model a wide range of ethical theories and prin-
ciples with the goal of using these models within autonomous systems. Logics for modeling ethical
theories, and their automated reasoners, have requirements that are different from modal logics used
for other purposes, e.g. for temporal reasoning. Meeting these requirements necessitates investigation
of new approaches for proof automation. Particularly, a quantified modal logic, the deontic cognitive
event calculus (DCEC ), has been used to model various versions of the doctrine of double effect,
akrasia, and virtue ethics. Using a fragment of DCEC , we outline these distinct characteristics and
present a sketches of an algorithm that can help with some aspects proof automation for DCEC .
1 Introduction
Modal logics have been used for decades to model and study a diverse set of subjects — e.g. temporal
reasoning, multi-agent systems, linguistic content and phenomena, and game theory [1, Part 4]. While
deontic modal logics have been used to study ethical principles, it is only recently that such logics have
been considered in a rigorous manner [3] with the goal of either using them in a computational system
or using such a logic to analyze computational systems.
For example, a quantified modal logic, the deontic cognitive event calculus (DCEC ), has been
used recently to model various versions of the Doctrine of Double Effect, akrasia, and virtue ethics
[14, 12, 15, 13, 7]. These ethical principles and theories have a unique set of characteristics when
compared with other domains, e.g. with temporal reasoning, in which modal logics have been used.1
This implies that logics for modeling ethical theories have requirements that are different than those for
modal logics used for other purposes. These requirements dictate investigation of new approaches for
proof automation. We present a central set of these requirements in this paper. Using a fragment C 1
of DCEC , we also present an algorithm that can help enable proof automation which partially satisfies
these requirements.
1A note on the terms “ethical principles” and “ethical theories.” An ethical theory is generally broader and more fundamental
than an ethical principle. An ethical principle is ultimately a declarative statement usually cast under one or more ethical
theories. E.g., the principle that one ought always to act with the intention to maximize utility for everyone would fall under the
ethical theory known as utilitarianism. For a classic presentation of the main ethical theories and their key principles, see [10].
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2 Requirements for Modeling Ethical Theories
To illustrate the unique characteristics required for modeling ethical theories and principle, we use the
Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE) augmented to handle self sacrifice. DDE is an ethical principle
that can account for human judgment in moral dilemmas: situations in which all available actions have
both significantly good and significantly bad consequences. According to DDE , an action α in such a
situation is permissible iff
“(1) it is morally neutral; (2) the net good consequences outweigh the bad consequences by
a large amount; and (3) some of the good consequences are intended, while none of the bad
consequences are. [11]”
A formalization ofDDE is presented in [11]. WhileDDE has some empirical support [9], it cannot ac-
count for instances of self-sacrifice. To handle self-sacrifice, an augmented version,DDE∗, is presented
and formalized in [13]. We now present an informal version of DDE∗ to illustrate the requirements.
We assume there is an ethical hierarchy of actions (e.g. forbidden, morally neutral, obligatory); see [2].
We also assume that we have a utility or goodness function for states of the world or effects. For an
autonomous agent a, an action α in a situation σ at time t is said to be DDE∗-compliant iff :
C1 At the time of the action, the agent a executing the action believes that the action is not forbidden (where,
again, we assume an ethical hierarchy such as the one given by Bringsjord [2], and require that the action
be morally neutral or above morally neutral in such a hierarchy);
C2 At the time of the action, the agent a believes that the net utility or goodness of the action is greater than
some positive amount γ;
C3a At the time of the action, the agent a performing the action intends only the good effects;
C3b At the time of the action, the agent a does not intend any of the bad effects;
C4 the bad effects are not used by a as a means to obtain the good effects [unless a knows that the bad effects
are confined to only a itself]; and
C5 if there are bad effects, the agent would rather the situation be different and the agent not have to perform
the action; that is, the action is unavoidable.
With DDE∗ as the background, we outline the following requirements that are necessary in modeling
not only DDE∗ but also other ethical theories and principles, such as virtue ethics and akrasia. We split
the requirements into two parts: requirements for the logic, and additional requirements for the reasoner.
Requirements for the Logic
R1 Multiple Modalities: Ethical principles have statements that take into account an agent’s
beliefs, intentions, obligations, etc. Any acceptable logic should be able to handle this.
R2 Time-Indexed Modalities: Intentions and beliefs at the time of an action matter rather than
intentions and beliefs at other times.
R3 De se Agent Modalities Agent-indexed modalities are common in BDI (belief/desire/inten-
tion) logics [18], but C4 requires self beliefs known as de se beliefs. This requires modalities
indexed by de se agents. This is needed to model statements such as “a believes that a herself
believes that ...”. For more details on de se beliefs, please see [13] and [5].
R4 Quantifiers: Quantifiers are needed to handle comparisons between actions and for ordering
actions by their consequences.
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While the above core requriments are needed for DDE∗, other features, such as the ability to represent
uncertainty and counterfactuals, may be needed for some ethical theories. We omit these requirements
from the core list above as there has not been as much discussion around these features. In addition to
handling the above requirements, any reasoner for the logic should have the following capabilities:
Additional Requirements for the Reasoner
1. Builtin Theories: Handling of simple arithmetic and causation. This is required for efficiently
computing consequences, and causes of actions.
2. Justifications and Explanations: Any reasoning system in an ethically charged scenario
should be able to explain and present its reasoning in a verifiable and understandable manner.
3. Answer Finding: The reasoner should not only be used for proving that an action is ethical
but should also be capable of finding the most ethical action in a given situation.
3 A Sparse Calculus C 1
C 1 is a straightforward modal extension of first-order logic that satisfies R1, R2, and R4. We have a modal
operator B for belief, an operator O for obligation, and G to denote goals. The syntax and inference
schemata of the system are shown below. Assume that we have a first-order alphabet augmented with
a fixed finite set of symbols for agents Ag = {a1, . . . ,an} and a set of totally ordered symbols for time
T = 〈t0, . . . , tn, . . .〉. Sometimes we use a for ai and t for ti. φ is a meta-variable for formulae, and A is
any first-order atomic symbol. Given this, the grammar for wffs of C 1 follows.
si ::= standard first-order terms
φ ::=

A(s1, . . .sn)
¬φ | φ∨ψ | ∀x.φ
B(a, t,φ) | O(a, t,φ,ψ) | G(a, t,ψ)
B(a, t,φ) states that a believes at time t that φ holds. O(a, t,φ,ψ) states that a ought to ψ at time t that if
φ holds. G(a, t,ψ) states that a has as a goal ψ at time t.
Inference System We have three inference schemata: {IR, IB, IO}, shown in Table 1. unify(a,b) denotes
the most general first-order unifier of a and b. First-order reasoning is performed through IR, which is
just first-order resolution. Reasoning with beliefs is done with IB. Beliefs propagate forward in time.
Reasoning with obligations is handled with IO: If an agent believes it has an obligation ψ when φ, and
believes that φ, then it has a goal ψ.
Description Inference Scheme
IR
φ1∨ . . .χ . . .∨φn ψ1∨ . . .¬χ′ . . .∨ψm where θ= unify(χ,χ′)
(φ1∨ . . .∨ . . .φn∨ψ1∨ . . .∨ψm)θ
[IRes]
IB
B(a, t1,φ1∨ . . .χ . . .∨φn) B(a, t2,ψ1∨ . . .¬χ′ . . .∨ψm) where t ≥ t1, t2; and θ= unify(χ,χ′)
B
(
a, t(φ1∨ . . .∨ . . .φn∨ψ1∨ . . .∨ψm)θ
) [IB]
IO
B(a,φ) B(a,O(a,φ,ψ))
G(a,ψ)
[IO]
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Proof from Γ to φ: A proof ΠΓφ from Γ to φ consists of a sequence of formulae φ1,φ2, . . . ,φn such that
(i) φn ≡ φ; and (ii) for all 1≤ i < n, φi is derived from {φ j| j < i} using IR, IB, or IO. Γ ` φ denotes that
there is a proof ΠΓφ from Γ to φ.
4 An Algorithm Sketch
We now present an algorithm for handling the proof system for C 1. Our goal is to leverage advances in
first-order theorem proving to build the relevant reasoner. There are two straightforward but flawed ways
this can be done. In the first approach, modal operators are simply represented by first-order predicates.
This approach is the fastest but can quickly lead to well-known inconsistencies, as demonstrated in [4].
In the second approach, the entire proof theory is implemented intricately in first-order logic, and the
reasoning is carried out within first-order logic. Here, the first-order theorem prover simply functions as
a declarative programming system. This approach, while accurate, can be inefficient.
Our algorithm is based on a technique we term shadowing. At at high-level, we alternate between
calling a first-order theorem prover and applying modal inference schemata. When we call the first-order
prover, all modal atoms are converted into propositional atoms (i.e. the former are shadowed), to prevent
substitution into modal contexts. This approach achieves speed without sacrificing consistency. The
algorithm is briefly described below.
First we define the syntactic operation of atomizing a formula, denoted by A. Given any arbitrary
formula φ, A[φ] is a unique atomic (propositional) symbol. Next, we define the level of a formula:
level : Boolean→ N.
level(φ) =

0;φ is purely propositional formulae; e.g. Rainy
1;φ has first-order predicates or quantifiers e.g. Sleepy(jack)
2;φ has modal formulae e.g. K(a, t,Sleepy(jack))
Given the above definition, we can define the operation of shadowing a formula to a level. See Figures 1a
and 1b.
Shadowing
To shadow a formula χ to a level l, replace all sub-formulae χ′ in χ such that level(χ′)> l with A[χ′]
simultaneously. We denote this by S[φ, l].
For a set Γ, the operation of shadowing all members in the set is simply denoted by S[Γ, l].
Assume we have access to a first-order prover P. For a set of pure first-order formulae Γ and a first-
order φ, P(Γ,φ) gives us a proof of Γ ` φ if such a first-order proof exists; otherwise fail is returned. See
the algorithm sketch given below for a reasoner for C 1:
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A New Way: ShadowProver
First-order Modal Logic
First-order Logic
Propositional Logic
f
Every formula at level t has a unique formula called its 
“shadow” in each level t’ < t
f 0
f 00
formula
first-order shadow
propositional shadow
(a) Shadowing a formulae to different levels (Overview)
Examples of shadows
formula
first-order shadow
propositional shadow
(8xB(a,Q) ^ P (x))
 8xA[B(a,Q)] ^ P (x) 
A8x[B(a,Q)] ^ A[P (x)]
(b) Shadowing a formulae to different levels (Ex-
amples)
Input: Input Formulae Γ, Goal Formula φ
Output: A proof of Γ ` φ if such a proof exists, otherwise fail
initialization;
while goal not reached do
answer = P
(
S[Γ,1],S[φ,1]
)
;
if answer 6= fail then
return answer ;
else
Γ′←− expand Γ by using any applicable modal inference schemata;
Γ′←− expand Γ′ by recursively reasoning forward in all modal contexts;
if Γ′ = Γ then
/* The input cannot be expanded further */
return fail
else
set Γ←− Γ′
end
end
end
The algorithm alternates between applying {IR} and {IB, IO}. The algorithm is instantiated recur-
sively to handle nested first-order reasoning within modal contexts as required in IB.
5 Implementation
The reasoner is available as an open-source Java library [16]. A lightweight Python interface is available
for quick prototyping and experimentation; see Figure 2. For the first-order prover, we use SNARK, due
to its facilities for extension with procedural attachments and rewrite systems [17]. In addition, SNARK
comes with theories for reasoning about simple arithmetic, lists, etc. For future work, we shall investigate
and pursue integration with other theorem provers. Our prover is also integrated within the HyperSlate
proof assistant, a modern extension of the Slate proof assistant [8]; see Figure 3 for an example.
6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have presented requirements that modal logics for modeling ethical theories should satisfy. A reason-
ing algorithm that can satisfy some of the requirements was presented. Future work involves extending
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Figure 2: Use of the DCEC reasoner from Python.
assume
Premise 2  C(t , P(robert, t , happens(display(wealth, host), t )))
from {Premise 2}
0 0 0
assume
Premise 1  C(t , ∀ a,t happens(display(wealth, a), t) ⇒ holds(wealthy(a), t))
from {Premise 1}
0
CC ⊢
G1  B(robert, t , holds(wealthy(host), t ))
from {Premise 2,Premise 1}
1 0CC ⊢
G2  B(host, t , B(robert, t , holds(wealthy(host), t )))
from {Premise 2,Premise 1}
2 1 0CC ⊢
G3  B(robert, t , B(host, t , B(robert, t , holds(wealthy(host), t ))))
from {Premise 2,Premise 1}
3 2 1 0
Figure 3: Use of the DCEC theorem prover within the HyperSlate workspace. Example from [6].
the reasoner to satisfy the other remaining requirements and proving that algorithm are sound and com-
plete with respect to a core inference system. As there are no similar reasoning systems for DCEC ,
direct comparison with other modal logic reasoners is not possible, but we plan to isolate fragments of
DCEC that can enable benchmarks and comparisons with reasoners for other similar logics..
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